Getting to net-zero emissions: National actions must be the primary focus

Gireesh Shrimali
8 min readSep 4, 2024

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We are starting to see the impacts of climate change at 1C warming, such as the loss of sea ice, melting glaciers and ice sheets, sea level rise, and more intense heat waves.[1] Scientists predict global temperature increases from human-made greenhouse gases will continue.

However, emissions remain high, and national actions remain unambitious and unimplemented.[2] Given lack of progress on climate mitigation, we are likely to see 2–3C increase in average global temperature by 2100, if not higher. This means that severe weather damage will also increase and intensify. That is, focus needs to be climate mitigation in an urgent manner.[3]

How to achieve our climate mitigation goals in the quickest way possible? While it is a good idea to consider actions by all stakeholders, it all comes back to national actions, given that it is the national actions that will drive the most significant change. Others — esp. private sector — can do their bit but are going to be marginal in the absence of credible and ambitious national actions.

For example, consider the case of net zero transition plans by corporations and financial institutions. Current work by us and others posits that credibility of corporate transition plans depends on national actions.[4] In fact, there are parallel efforts to create national transition plans that complement corporate transition plans.[5]

So, it comes back to ambitious and credible national actions, and to the question: What do ambitious and credible national actions look like? In some sense, they are likely to mirror what has been proposed for corporate actions.[6]

First, countries need economy wide emission targets and sectoral emission pathways. Country-level emission targets should ideally be differentially Paris aligned — e.g., net zero by a certain time. While there is consensus that we need to get to net zero by 2050 to remain within 1.5C warming,[7] this may vary across countries, such as China and India targeting net zero by 2060 and 2070, respectively.[8]

In this context, sectoral emission pathways are necessary and should add up to country-level emission pathways.[9] That is, we need to get to the economy wide targets for each sector and the emission reductions across sectors should add up to what the country needs to do. A notable example is the UK that has created sectoral emission roadmaps to net zero emissions by 2050.[10]

Second, sectoral technology-mix and CAPEX pathways are required. Sectoral technology-mix pathways may be necessary for market size signaling, in terms of what quantity to buy and sell in a particular year. This essentially means pathways that signal, on a sector level, what would be the mix of production from different technologies — e.g., in the case of the power sector, this would be the mix of production from solar, wind, nuclear, coal, gas, among others. A notable example is Japan that has created sectoral technology roadmaps for various industries, including hard-to-abate industry sectors, such as steel and cement.[11]

Sectoral CAPEX pathways would be necessary for investor signaling, in terms of providing guiderails on what investments would be required and at what time. These pathways would follow from the technology-mix pathways, which would require corresponding investments in respective technologies. While such pathways exist at the global level, such as by the IEA and others,[12] we also need such pathways at the national level, such as by Ember in India.[13]

In this context, it may be argued that it is time to pick some winners, while allowing for some innovation. This is because many sectors have a net zero path based on proven technologies, and we are critically short of time.[14] In this case, the examples for solar photovoltaic and Lithium batteries come to mind.

Third, policy, regulatory, and coordination support are required. This is the critical missing piece in many cases, given that barriers faced in implementing long-term, stable, and consistent policies that match the pathways developed earlier.

A lot can be managed by carbon price pathways, but they may be absent. It is well known that the simplest policy is a globally coordinated carbon price pathway, allowing for common and differentiated responsibilities. However, these policies haven’t become as widespread as desired, despite continued interest.[15] In their absence, we need a combination of policies, simultaneously focused on technology development as well as at scale deployment.

In development, we need technology roadmaps, R&D&D support, IP support, etc. R&D support is typically via creation of robust national innovation systems (NIS) for low-carbon development.[16] That is, support for provision of research and development activities, via universities as well as the private sector.

R&D&D support requires grants and low-cost capital. That is, once a technology passes through the research stage, it needs to be demonstrated in partnership with the public and private sector. In most cases this requires zero/low-cost capital, as demonstrated by the loan guarantee program in the US.[17]

In deployment, nations need markets, subsidies, and supporting policies. They need to create markets — public and private — to provide quantity signals. A first step is the creation of markets by providing long-term market size signals that are both stable and consistent. A notable example is India’s 2030 solar target of 500GW capacity installation.[18]

They also need to provide subsidies — implicit and explicit — to provide price (certainty) signals. A second step thus is the recognition that many clean technologies require subsidies to be market competitive. While a carbon tax provides this subsidy, in its absence explicit subsidies may be provided while ensuring that these subsidies are cost-effective. [19]

Finally, they need to provide support — infrastructure, processes — to reduce remaining risks to investment. A third, and crucial, step thus is to provide all the required support that large-scale deployment requires. A notable example is the German roof-top solar support that reduced transaction costs for at scale deployment.[20]

Policy can also play a role in coordination and information provision. In this context, policymakers can also play a significant coordination role by bringing different stakeholders together and ensuring that barriers to at-scale deployment are addressed via appropriate support, including information.

This brings up the time dimension, in particular given political economic considerations — e.g., election cycles — that make long-term policymaking a hard problem.[21] All this can be a mix of long-term plans and short-term actions. A potential solution is to commit to long-term goals as well as short-term actions that are regularly updated.

In this context, short-term means 5 years, given that this mimics election as well as planning cycles in many countries. Furthermore, revisions every 5 years, with annual stock takes, would allow for change in political leadership as well as on-ground economic realities as well as for ensuring that commitments are being followed.

Finally, we need to also consider where the barriers to required national actions are, given that a lot of what has been discussed is an ideal prescription that ignores on ground realities.

First, the bottom-up support may be absent. This is the case in many jurisdictions, resulting in absence of popular support for strong climate policies. In absence of popular support, such as in the US Republican states,[22] it becomes hard to crate long-term policies that are stable and consistent.

This would require credible information around risks/benefits of climate change/actions. While lack of popular support could be for various reasons, it would be possible to influence this by providing credible information on how climate change is material in specific, individual context.[23] This information provision would be tailored to individual contexts that matter.

Second, local capacity may not exist. In many jurisdictions, even though ambitious climate goals exist, local capacity does not exist to create appropriate strategies outlined above. This is particularly true in developing countries.[24] This requires partnerships that create local capacity in the long-term, including with global support.

Third, local finance may not exist. In developing countries, local markets don’t have enough capacity to support ambitious climate targets, due to competing priorities including on development.[25] This is exacerbated due to the high cost of capital in developing countries, which is a well-known impediment to the brown-to-green transition.[26] This creates a case for not only strengthening domestic markets but also using international climate finance for the highest leverage. This can come from various sources, including governments and development banks.

In summary, to achieve our climate goals, we need to recognize the crucial role of national actions, develop long-term national action plans, and create the required support for these national action plans in the global context.

[1] See Effects — NASA Science

[2] See Credible Contributions: Bolder Plans for Higher Climate Ambition in the Next Round of NDCs (energy-transitions.org)

[3] In this context, other related issues — e.g., adaptation, nature, biodiversity, just transition — are important, but should be considered along with climate mitigation in a Do No Significant Harm category.

[4] See A framework for assessing and managing dependencies in corporate transition plans by Adrien Rose, Gireesh Shrimali, Krista Halttunen :: SSRN

[5] See National Transition Plans_Policy Brief for CFMCA.pdf (financeministersforclimate.org)

[6] See Guidance-on-assessing-Companies-Transition-plans_Public-consultation-2.pdf (worldbenchmarkingalliance.org)

[7] See Global Warming of 1.5 ºC — (ipcc.ch)

[8] See China’s Pledge to Be Carbon Neutral by 2060: What It Means — The New York Times (nytimes.com) and COP26: India PM Narendra Modi pledges net zero by 2070 (bbc.com)

[9] See One Earth Climate Model: Sectoral Pathways to Net-Zero Emissions — United Nations Environment — Finance Initiative (unepfi.org)

[10] See Climate Change Committee (theccc.org.uk)

[11] See Transition Finance / METI Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry

[12] See Net Zero by 2050 — A Roadmap for the Global Energy Sector (iea.blob.core.windows.net)

[13] See Beyond Tripling: India needs $101bn additional financing for net-zero pathway | Ember (ember-climate.org)

[14] See The evidence is clear: the time for action is now. We can halve emissions by 2030. — IPCC

[15] See Countries Turn to Carbon Taxes Amid Calls for a Global System (bloombergtax.com)

[16] See Planning for clean technology diffusion: Identifying innovation system functions in country technology action plans — ScienceDirect

[17] See Loan Programs Office | Department of Energy

[18] See India Energy Outlook 2021 — Analysis — IEA

[19] See Cost-effective policies for reaching India’s 2022 renewable targets — ScienceDirect

[20] See As Germany Cuts Red Tape, Renewable Installations Boom — Yale E360

[21] See Long Problems | Princeton University Press

[22] See How a Republican election sweep could hobble U.S. climate efforts — The Washington Post

[23] See Climate change communication: Challenges, insights, and opportunities — ScienceDirect

[24] See https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2022/05/strengthening-capacity-for-climate-action-in-developing-countries_a8108519/0481c16a-en.pdf

[25] See Scaling up Climate Finance for Emerging Markets and Developing Economies (imf.org)

[26] See Higher cost of finance exacerbates a climate investment trap in developing economies | Nature Communications

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Gireesh Shrimali
Gireesh Shrimali

Written by Gireesh Shrimali

Gireesh Shrimali is Head, Transition Finance, Oxford Sustainable Finance Group, University of Oxford.

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